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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION
NoRToN STEUBEN*A RTICLE 17 of the Warsaw Convention which applies to international
air transportation provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.'
This provision appears to impose absolute liability, although when read
in conjunction with Article 20,2 it will be seen to create merely a rebuttable
presumption of liability.3 Nevertheless the effects of Article 17 and the con-
vention as a whole in the case of wrongful death have left American courts
in a quandary.
The problem with which the courts are faced arises from the fact that
the common law provides no action for wrongful death,4 and that therefore
in common law countries such actions must be based on statute.5 Most com-
mon law jurisdictions have passed such statutes,6 but these are not thought
to be extraterritorial. 7 Interrelated with the abovementioned is the American
conflict rule that the right of action must be based on the law of the place in
which the force impinged which caused the injury.8 When that place is a
foreign jurisdiction, it is often difficult and expensive to ascertain the law.
Even if finally established, it may well not agree with American ideas of
propriety. In this context the American courts have been called upon to deter-
mine whether Article 17 not only creates a presumption of liability but also
* Member of New York State Bar; LL.B., University of Michigan.
1. Article 17, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
2. 1. The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures.
2. In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be liable
if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the
handling of the aircraft, or in the navigation and that, in all respects, he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage.
3. See, e.g., Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law 343, 362 (2d ed. 1951).
4. See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, 1 Comp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); Prosser,
Torts 709 (2d ed. 1955); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Colum. L.
Rev. 239 (1929).
5. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4 at 710; Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (Sup.
Ct. 1838).
6. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4 at 710; Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
7. See, e.g., Weiner v. Specific Pharmaceuticals Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E.2d 673
(1949); Orr, The Rio Revision of the Warsaw Convention, Part II, 21 J. Air L. & Com.
181 (1955).
8. See Prosser, op. cit. note 4 at 710; Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E.
198 (1918). Although the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 966-68 (1958), enacts a wrongful death action when the place of the wrong is the
no-man's land of the high seas, our law enacts no right of action for wrongful death in
foreign jurisdiction. See Orr, supra note 7 at 183.
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a cause of action for wrongful death.9 They have provided three different
answers to this question.
In Wyman v. Pan American Airlines'0 the plaintiff's testator lost his life
while a passenger enroute from Guam to Manila on one of defendant's airplanes
which never arrived at any known destination. The plaintiff asserted a cause
of action for wrongful death under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
which was denied on the ground that the right to bring a death action at
common law is purely statutory and since all of the rules laid down in the
convention were "well within the framework of existing legal rights and
remedies,"" no new substantive rights were created.12 In short, the court held
that the convention merely establishes a presumption which may modify the
application of what must be independently operative legal norms.
The opposite conclusion was reached in Salamon v. Koninklijke Lucht-
Vaart Maatschappij.13 A passenger in defendant's airplane became ill during
the passage from Amsterdam to New York and died a month later in New
York. The court, being of the opinion that Article 17 clearly purported to
create a cause of action and observing that the "convention overrides and
supplants any contrary local law,"'1 4 held that the passenger's executrix could
base a wrongful death action on the convention itself. The court concluded
with the statement that, "if the Convention did not create a cause of action
in Art. 17, it is difficult to understand what Art. 17 did do.""' Of course
Wyman suggests that this is not as difficult as the court in Salamon might
have supposed. 16
Komlos v. Air Force1 appears to lie in the middle ground between Wyman
and Salamon. Komlos lost his life when defendant's airplane enroute from
Paris to New York crashed on the island of San Miguel. Rejecting the notion
that under the convention the contract of carriage can become the gravamen
9. In American courts under the existing rules, when a plaintiff claims damage for
wrongful death occurring in a foreign jurisdiction as a result of an airplane mishap, he
must establish the law of such jurisdiction governing wrongful death. If Article 17 was
able to enact a wrongful death cause of action, there would be no need to undertake the
expensive and frustrating task of ascertaining and establishing the law of the foreign
jurisdiction.
10. 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48
N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944).
11. Id. at 966, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
12. Accord, Finne v. Koninklijke LuchtVaart Maatschappij, 11 F.R.D. 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); Supine v. Air France, 100 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); cf. Garcia v. Pan
American Airways, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y.
852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1945).
13. - Misc. -, 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 965, 120
N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1953).
14. Id. at 771.
15. Id. at 773. Accord, Glenn v. Cubana, 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952); cf.
Ross v. Pan American Airways, - Misc. -, 123 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd,
299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1953).
16. See also, Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law 87, 173 (1954).
Drion suggests that what Article 17 did do was delineate the bounds within which there
is a presumption of liability against the air carrier.
17. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1953).
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of an action for wrongful death, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim
had to be based on the laws of Portugal. Had the court contented itself with
deciding the case before it, the opinion would not have been significantly
different than that in Wyman. However, the court added that since the con-
vention admittedly creates at least a presumption of liability, then if the place
of the accident does not provide a cause of action on which the presumption
can operate, the presumption would be meaningless unless in such cases the
convention also provides a cause of action. The unarticulated major premise
adopted by the court seems to be that Article 17 was intended to be meaning-
ful in all cases of wrongful death.'
8
These conflicting decisions indicate the scope of the interpretative diffi-
culties encountered in an attempt to apply the Warsaw Convention to wrongful
death. Of course, the prime rule of treaty interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the parties,' 9 but neither the senatorial debates20 nor Secretary
of State Hull's report to President Roosevelt,2 1 recommending adherence to
the convention, are especially helpful in determining whether Article 17 inde-
pendently creates a cause of action for wrongful death. Thus, it would seem,
18. Accord, Fernandez v. Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Noel v.
Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1956); d. Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, 117
N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 App. Div. 105 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 830, 114 N.E.2d 37
(1952). It has been suggested that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has no other
cause of action in order to claim a cause of action under Article 17. See Fernandez v.
Venezolana, supra. It would be more in keeping with the pattern set up in the convention,
however, to allow the plaintiff to claim under the Warsaw -Convention and to place the
burden on the defendant to rebut this by proving that a cause of action should be
obtained under the lex loci deliciti. One should note that throughout the convention the
burden is placed on the defendant to rebut the presumption of liability. See, e.g., Article
17 and Article 20. Secondly, it would seem that the difficulty of proving a negative would
place an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff, something that the convention appears
designed to alleviate.
19. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1928); Valentine v. United States
ex rel. Neidecker, 29D U.S. 5 (1936).
20. 78 Cong. Rec. Part II 11577-79 (1934). The only items referred to in the
Congressional Record were a reservation and a change in wording. The reservation pro-
vided that the convention shall not apply to international transportation that may be
performed by the United States or any territory or possession under its jurisdiction.
Secondly, the French text was amended to correct an error in translation.
21. Letter from Secretary of State Hull to President Roosevelt in 1934:
The effect of article 17 (Ch. III) of the Convention is to create a presumption
of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere happening of an accident occa-
sioning injury or death of a passenger subject to certain defenses allowed under
the Convention to the aerial carrier. The burden is upon the carrier to show that
the injury or death has not been the result of negligence on the part of the
carrier or his agents. It is understood that while this rule has been adopted in
some jurisdictions in this country in aircraft accident cases upon the theory of
res ipsa loquitur, in certain other jurisdictions in this country the old common
law rule has been applied in accident cases arising in air transportation, so that
the passenger or his legal representative has the burden of proving negligence in
the operation of the aircraft, before the carrier would be held liable for damages;
the principle of placing the burden on the carrier to show lack of negligence in
international air transportation in order to escape liability, seems reasonable in
view of the difficulty which a passenger has in establishing the cause of an
accident in air transportation.
U.S. Aviation Reports 243.
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in the search for the intent of the parties,2 2 other sources must be utilized.
Certainly the preparatory documents and debates of the convention are a
fruitful source of evidence of that intent, and a recent analysis of these
materials tends to establish the proposition that Article 17 was intended to
give a cause of action for wrongful death.23 Another source of perhaps more
circumstantial evidence of intent may lie in the legal suppositions which the
representatives of the foremost drafting states2 4 may reasonably be presumed
to have entertained at the conference and the more or less predictable impact
that Article 17 has had on their legal systems. It is with this latter source
that the remainder of this discussion will be concerned.
DRAFTING STATES' SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLE114 OF WRONGFUL DEATH
IN PASSENGER-CARRIER RELATIONSHIP
The rule in a majority of the states present at the Warsaw Conference, 25
which one might call the "civil law" participants, is that one who wrongfully
causes the death of another is liable to those whom the deceased may legally
be bound to support.2 6 Therefore, the words, "The carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of the death . ..of a passenger,127 imply a
form of liability generally accepted by the civilians, as opposed to the unique
nature of the wrongful death liability in the common law.28 Considering this,
it would not be unreasonable to find that the drafters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion intended Article 17 to be a statement of the liability of the air carrier
in cases of wrongful death.
The French view appears to be that a public carrier is liable to the
representatives of a deceased passenger on an implied provision in the contract
of carriage to carry safely.-9 When the carrier has not succeeded in carrying
a passenger safe and sound to his destination, it is liable.30 Illustratively, the
22. The drafting parties of the Convention were: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands, Poland,
Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
23. See, e.g., Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, Part I,
26 J. Air. L. & Com. 217 (1960). This article presents a complete analysis of the prepara-
tory documents and debates of the Warsaw Convention. It clearly demonstrates from
the basic convention materials that Article 17 was intended to give an ex contractu cause
of action for wrongful death.
24. This comment wil not attempt to make an exhaustive analysis of the drafting
states, but only examine a few of the more prominent ones.
25. Supra note 22.
26. See, e.g., Mazeaud, Trait6 Theorique et Pratique de La Responsabilit6 Civile 321
(4th ed. 1947); de Juglart, Trait6 Elementaire de Droit A6rien 240 (1952); Kaftal, La
Reparation Des Dommages Caus6s Aux Voyageurs Dans Les Transports ACriens 3, 4
(1930); Gardner, Comparative Air Law, 20 J. Air. L. & Com. 34 (1953).
27. Warsaw Convention Article 17.
28. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4 at 710.
29. See, e.g., de Juglart, op. cit. supra note 25 at 240; Kaftal, op. cit. supra note
25 at 4.
30. Lambert v. la Compagnie des Messageries Ariennes, Cour d' Appel de Paris,
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Cour d' Appel de Paris31 faced the question of the liability of a carrier to the
representatives of a passenger and held that contractual obligation principles
obligate the company to carry the passenger safely to his destination and
that the carrier is liable to the representatives of the deceased for non-
performance of that obligation, if he cannot establish the presence of force
majeure or an outside force not under his control.32 In Lambert v. la Com-
pagnie des Messageries Arienne,33 the Tribunal Civil de la Seine held that
there could be no exception to the general rule that the liability was con-
tractual. The Cour d' Appel de Paris affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
holding that the company owed a contractual obligation to the passenger and
his representatives by virtue of Article 114734 of the Code and that this obli-
gation was to carry the passenger safe and sound to his destination. The
nonperformance of that obligation therefore gave rise to liability. Significantly
we may find a similarity in wording and legal effect between Article 17 and
Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention and Article 1147 of the French Civil
Code.35 Furthermore, this doctrine of contractual liability was held to be
implied in the French Air Navigation Law of 1924, which declares the air
carrier a guarantor of the safety of passengers and goods. 36
The German solution to this problem varied slightly from that of the
French. The German Air Traffic Act of August 1, 1922, 37 imposed liability
on the owner or operator 38 for the injury or death of any persons or the injury
to any property in the aircraft, in any other aircraft or on the surface caused
by the use or operation 39 of the aircraft. Further, Article 844 of the German
Civil Code explicitly places on the wrongdoer the obligation to pay for the
decedent's funeral expenses and to provide for the support of those third
Nov. 28, 1925, (1926) Revue Juridique Internationale de la Locomotion Airienne 116;
see, e.g., authorities cited supra note 29.
31. Veuve Percy James Evans, Petchett et Derry v. Compagnie Franco-Roumaine
de Navigation Arienne, Cour d' Appel Paris, June 10, 1926, (1926) Revue Juridique
Internationale de la Locomotion Arienne 379.
32. Accord, Veuve de Courson de ]a Villeneuve v. Soci~t6 a6ronautique Lat6co~re,
Cour d' Appel de Paris, Feb. 7, 1927, (127) Revue Juridique Internationale de la Loco-
motion Afrienne 239.
33. Tribunal Civil de Ia Seine, Dec. 18, 1922, (1923) Revue Juridique Internationale
de la Locomotion Arienne 75.
34. Article 1147 provides:
A debtor shall be ordered to pay damages if there is occasion therefor, either on
account of non-performance of the obligation or on account of delay in perform-
ing it, whenever he does not establish that non-performance is due to an outside
cause which cannot be charged to him provided there is no bad faith on his part.
The French Civil Code 322 (rev. ed. Cochard trans]. 1930).
35. Air Navigation Law of May 31, 1924, (1924) Journal Officiel 5048 (Fr.). See,
e.g., authorities cited supra note 30.
36. Both Articles 17 and 20 of the Warsaw Convention and Article 1147 of the
French Civil Code create a presumption of liability on the part of the air carrier. The
carrier may rebut this presumption in both cases by proof of an outside cause or the
absence of negligence on his or his agent's part.
37. Air Traffic Act of Aug. 1, 1922, (1922) Reichsgesetzblatt 681 (Ger.). Air Traffic




parties to whom the decedent was bound by law to furnish maintenance.40
On the basis of these two provisions it is apparent, although no case has been
found which definitely holds this, that those who have a cause of action by
reason of Article 844 either for funeral expenses or maintenance may enforce
the liability of the owner or operator created by the Air Traffic Act. We may
again note the similarity in effect and wording of Article 17 of the convention
and Section 19 of the Air Traffic Act.41
The Italian Air Navigation Act of 19244 imposes responsibility on the
airline for the death or injury of any of its passengers and explicitly provides
a lien for damages resulting to the representatives of a mortally injured
passenger. 43 This special legislation presumably does not limit Article 1218
of the Italian Civil Code, which is interpreted in the same manner as Article
1147 of the French Civil Code, to place on the carrier the obligation to carry
the passenger safely to his destination and if the carrier fails to fulfill this
obligation, and the passenger is killed, the representatives of the deceased are
given a contractual cause of action against the carrier.44 It would appear that
generally civil law jurisdictions reach the same result as noted in France,
Germany and Italy.45
In England as in America wrongful death damages were considered a
remedy not given by the common law; one who sought to recover for the
wrongful death of another must find his cause of action in statutory form.40
However, unlike the majority of American jurisdictions at the time of the
convention,4 7 an English carrier was regarded as the insurer of the safe arrival
40. See, e.g., Von Mehren, The Civil Law System 345 (1957).
41. Section 19 of the Air Traffic Act of Aug. 21, 1936 provides:
if in the operation of an aircraft, a person by accident is killed or his body or
health injured or damage caused to a thing the owner or operator of the aircraft
is obliged to compensate for such injury or damage.
42. Italian Air Navigation Act of 1924, (1924) Revue Juridique Internationale de Ia
Locomotion A~riennes 51.
43. Italian Air Navigation Act of 1924, art. 39, § 2.
44. Article 1218 of the Italian Civil Code provides that:
a debtor who does not perform his obligation exactly is liable for damages unless
he can establish that non-performance or delay in performing is due to a cause
which can not be charged to him.
Translation from U.S. Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook, Italy M 353-3D 11
(1944). See, e.g., Cipioni v. Soci6t6 pour la developpement de 1' Aviation, Corte di
Cassazione, Jan. 16, 1926, (1932) Revue G~n&ale Droit A&ien 912.
45. See, e.g., Cha, The Air Carrier's Liability in Anglo-American and French Law,
7 Air L. Rev. 1954 (1936); Gardner, Comparative Air Law, 20 J. Air L. & Com. 34 (1953);
Leroy, Observations on Comparative Air Law, 8 Air L. Rev. 259 (1937); Knauth, Air
Carrier's Liability in Comparative Law, 7 Air L. Rev. 261 (1936); Cosentini, Air Law
and -Comparative Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 292 (1932). In the several Central and South
American countries which were parties to the convention the liability of an air carrier
to a non-passenger for the death or injury of a passenger arises from an implied con-
tractual obligation to transport the passenger safely to his destination. See, e.g., Rigalt,
Principios de Derecho Aero (1939); Hamilton, Manual de Derecho Aereo (1950); Joseph-
son, Empire of the Air (1944); Marchant, Aviation in Brazil, 10 Air L. Rev. 44 (1939);
Grant, Air Carrier's Liability: Latin America, 7 Air L. Rev. 292 (1936).
46. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Comp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); Fatal Accidents Act,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93; Prosser, Torts 709, 710 (2d ed. 1955).
47. See, e.g., Sec. of State Hull's Letter, supra note 21; Schneider, Negligence in the
Law of Aviation, 12 B.U.L. Rev. 17 (1932).
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of goods and passengers subject to the defenses of an act of God, inherent
vice of the goods, or fault of the shipper-passenger. 48 Therefore, the English
presumably had no difficulty accepting the presumption of liability placed
on the air carrier by Article 17.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the English approach to the
nature of the wrongful death remedy differed from that of the drafting parties
examined above. Significantly though, the English in their application of the
Warsaw Convention4 9 appear to have adopted a view of the effect of Article
17 in wrongful death situations quite similar to that employed by the civil
law nationsY0
It would seem reasonable to assume that the delegations from the various
civil law nations, in helping to draft a provision reminiscent of their own local
legislation, intended to achieve a result with which they were familiar. This
assumption, in addition to the English adoption of a result like that reached
in the civil law states, tends to support the view that this was the result
intended by the drafting parties.
DECISIONS OF THE DRAFTING STATES INVOLVING ARTICLE 17
OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
E. Georgiades, 51 Secretary General of the French Society of Air Law, has
stated that the "Warsaw Convention established whether one might wish it
or not the rule of contractual liability of the carrier," 52 and the Tribunal de
Commerce de Marseille has held that, "in the case of carriage which is inter-
national within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, no other action for
damages however founded may be brought against the carrier than the action
provided in the Convention" 53 (Emphasis added.) Further, in Hennessey v.
Air France8 4 where the representative of the deceased brought an action for
damages on the basis of Article 1382 of the French Civil Code,8 5 the Cour
d' Appel de Paris held this theory improper and that the cause of action must
be based on Article 17 of the convention. It reasoned that Article 17, as
incorporated in the contract of carriage,80 made the carrier liable to the rep-
resentatives of the deceased, and that delictual liability could not be asserted
48. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
49. As embedded in Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36; Air Navigation
Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8, c. 44.
50. See, discussion of English application of Warsaw Convention on p. 373 of text.
51. Editor of the Review Francaise de Droit Afrien.
52. Georgiades, Quelques Riflexions sur L'Affretement de A6ronefs et le Project
Convention Tokio, (1959) Revue Francaise de Droit A6rien 113. But see, Drion, Limitation
of Liabilities in International Air Law 83, 173 (1954).
53. Delia Roma v. Air France, Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, Nov. 3, 1955,
(1955) Revue Francaise de Droit Afrien 94.
54. Cour d' Appel de Paris, Feb. 25, 1954, (1954) Revue Francaise de Droit Arien
45.
55. Every act whatever of an individual which causes injury to another obliges
the one owing to whom it has occurred to make reparation for it.
The French Civil Code 381 (rev. ed. Cochard transl. 1930).
56. By reason of the airplane being engaged in an international flight.
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since "the aim of the Convention was to unify as far as possible the legislation
of the various countries dealing with international air transport, and to estab-
lish for such transport common liability rules which would exclude all other
causes of action. '5 7 It would appear there is judicial authority in France for
considering Article 17 as creating wrongful death liability on the part of the
carrier.58
Illustrative of the German interpretation is the 1939 decision of the
Frankfurt Landgericht, which held that, "under the circumstances [being
engaged in an international flight] the action based on Articles 17 and 22
paragraph (1) of the Warsaw Convention is well-founded." 59 The Reichs-
gericht,60 in a situation similar to that faced by the Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit in Komlos v. Air France,6' affirmed a decision by the Berlin
Kammergericht which held that "the right to compensation for damage [result-
ing from the death of a passenger in international carriage] is based on con-
tract and not on delictual liability. 5 2 The Reichsgericht considered that since
the Warsaw Convention is always incorporated in a contract of international
carriage, Article 17 would provide a contractual right to recover damages for
the wrongful death of a passenger.63
Although the authorities are not as clear as one might wish, as far as
can be determined, the Italian, 64 Belgian, 65 and Swiss60 courts appear to allow
a plaintiff to predicate a wrongful death action against a carrier on Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention. Again, as in the case of France and Germany,
the rationale seems to be that of contractual liability resulting from the incor-
poration of Article 17 in the contract of carriage. In Italy, however, the Corte
di Cassazione67 concluded that the Warsaw Convention does not exclude the
57. Hennessy v. Air France, supra note 54 at 226. The court appeared to be of the
view that if the plaintiff were allowed to bring any other cause of action than that given
herein by virtue of Article 17, such a result would deviate from the unifying aim of the
convention.
58. See authorities cited supra notes 53 & 54. But see, Drion, Limitation of Liabilities
in International Air Law 83, 173 (1954); Munier v. Drvy, Tribunal Civil de la Seine,
Nov. 27, 1953, (1953) Revue Francaise de Droit Arien 76.
59. See A v. B, Landgericht, Frankfurt, March 8, 1939, (1939) Archiv fUr Luftrecht
180; X v. Y, Kammergericht Berlin, June 28, 1938, (1938) Revue G~nrale Droit Arien 301,
aff'd, Reichsgericht, June 5, 1939, (1939) Archiv fiur Luftrecht 172.
60. The Reichsgericht was Germany's highest court at this time.
61. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1953). If the
plaintiff's cause of action were based on the German Civil Code Article 823 or Section 19
of the Air Traffic Act, it would be considered as delictual and by law pass to the social
insurance authorities. However, if it were based on Article 17, it would be contractual and
not pass. It was found to be contractual.
62. Supra note 59.
63. X v. Y, supra note 59.
64. See Football Team Torino v. S. A. Aviolinee Italiane, Corte di Cassazione, March
9, 1953, (1955) Zeitschrift fiir Luftrecht 70.
65. See Fisher et al. v. C.I.E. SA.B.E.N.A., Tribunal de premiere instance de Bruxelles,
May 6, 1950, (1950) Revue Francaise, de Droit Arien 411.
66. See Jaquet v. Club Neuchatelois d' Aviation, Tribunal f~dral, Ire Cour, Dec.
3, 1957, (1958) Zeitschrift ffir Luftrecht 259.
67. This is the highest Italian court, roughly equivalent to the United States
Supreme Court.
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possibility of basing an action for compensation on the delictual provisions
of the civil code, 8 but this too will be subject to the same limitations as an
action based on the convention. 9 Both the Swiss and the Belgian courts appear
to require that the cause of action be based on the convention.70
An important factor in this analysis is the English approach. 71 The
English, for whom treaties are not self-executing, enacted the Warsaw Con-
vention as part of their Carriage by Air Act of 1932.72 Schedule I of the act
divides carriage by air into: A-International Carriage giving effect to the
Warsaw Convention, and B-Non-international Carriage. Schedule II of the
act establishes a uniform rule within the United Kingdom in respect to causes
of action arising from the death of a passenger during the course of interna-
tional carriage by air.73 Under the system of law introduced by the Carriage
by Air Act, the cause of action arises in contract, not in tort.74 In the event
of a passenger's death those persons who sustain damage by reason of the
death are entitled to recover because the deceased's contract of carriage in-
corporates Article 17 which provides for the liability of the carrier.75
The English courts first adopted this analysis in Grein v. Imperial
Airways.76 Grein purchased a roundtrip ticket from London to Antwerp, with
an agreed stopping place at Brussels. On the journey back from Antwerp the
airplane went down in Belgium killing Grein. The action was brought by his
widow, who claimed damages for his death under Lord Campbell's Act. 77
The defendant contended that there was no action under Lord Campbell's
Act because the action prestribed by the Warsaw Convention was in contract.
In upholding this defense, the judges agreed that the action lay in contract.
Two of the judges thought that Lord Campbell's Act could be expanded to
cover this cause of action.7 8 However, the majority felt that the effect of the
Carriage by Air Act of 1932 was "to make Lord Campbell's Act inapplicable
68. The conclusion reached in France on this point is that the Warsaw Convention
precludes any action except that provided by Article 17. See, Hennessy v. Air France
supra note 54.
69. Football Team Torino v. SA. Aviolinee Italiane, supra note 64.
70. See cases cited supra notes 64 and 66. Reported Central or South American
cases dealing with the application of Article 17 in cases of wrongful death could not be
found.
71. English law, unlike the American Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. VI, § 2, does not
regard treaties as the law of the land, until enacted by Parliament. See, e.g., Indemnity
Insurance v. Pan American Airlines, 58 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); cf. Kuhn, The
Treaty Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, in 3 Selected Essays
on Constitutional Law 397 (1938).
72. Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36; Air Navigation Act, 1936, 1
Edw. 8, c. 44. 
.
73. See, e.g., Aaronson, International Carriage by Air-Uniformity in United Kingdom
.Law, 106 L.J. 755 (1956).
74. See, e.g., Grein v. Imperial Airways, [19371 1 K.B. 50; Preston v. Hunting Air
Transport, [19561 2 Q.B. 454; Aaronson, supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 74.
76. [1937] 1 K.B. 50.
77. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
78. Grein v. Imperial Airways, supra note 76 at 71, 80.
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to the disaster which is the subject of this action, and to substitute for its
provisions for this purpose those of article 17 of Schedule I [creating in this
situation the liability of the carrier] and those of Schedule II [designating
the parties who may enforce this liability]."79 In 1956, a unanimous court in
Preston v. Hunting Air Transport"0 followed the majority holding in the
Grein case. It would seem clear that the English authorities regard Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention (as implemented in the Carriage by Air Act) as
creating liability on the part of the air carrier in cases of wrongful death.8 '
CONCLUSION
The judicial interpretation and application of a treaty is governed to a
large extent by the intent of the drafting parties.8 2 The judicial interpretation
and application of the Warsaw Convention and Article 17 should therefore
be governed by the intent of the drafting parties. One source of this intent
may lie in the legal suppositions which the representatives of the foremost
drafting states may reasonably be presumed to have entertained at the con-
ference. As to this factor, one might note that the drafting parties, examined
above, with the exception of the English, thought of wrongful death liability
as the result of the carrier's failure to transport the passenger safely to his
destination. Also, there is a pronounced similarity in the effect and wording
of Articles 17 and 20 of the convention and those provisions of the civil codes
and legislative enactments of many of the drafting states which have been
interpreted to impose liability upon the carrier for the wrongful death of a
passenger.
Certainly, the preparatory documents and debates of the convention are
a fruitful source of evidence of that intent, and a recent analysis reaches the
conclusion that the drafting parties intended Article 17 to impose contractual
liability upon the air carrier for wrongful death.88 Lastly, the impact of the
Warsaw Convention on the legal systems of the drafting states may provide
a source of perhaps more circumstantial evidence of intent. Here one should
note that the courts of the drafting states generally appear to employ Article
17 as the basis for imposing wrongful death liability upon the air carrier;
significantly, the English have adopted this view. Therefore, it might be
reasonably concluded that the drafting parties of the Warsaw Convention
intended that Article 17 create liability on the part of the air carrier for the
wrongful death of a passenger. However, it must be mentioned that there is
79. Id. at 91.
80. [1956] 2 Q.B. 454.
81. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 74. But see, Orr, The Revision of the
Warsaw -Convention, Part II, 21 J. Air L. & Com. 181 (1955).
82. See, e.g., Nielen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1928); Valentine v. United States
ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 39 (1942).
83. Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention Part I, 26 J.
Air L. & Com. 217 (1960).
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opposition to this view among legal theorists and courts on both sides of the
Atlantic.84
This result may be reached in the American courts by reasoning that in
an international carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention, Article 17
becomes one of the terms of the contract of carriage. As a result, the carrier
contractually assumes the liability for the wrongful death of a passenger.
Local law may be employed to determine who can enforce this liability.
Although unprecedented, this result would bring the American judicial inter-
pretation and application of the Warsaw Convention into conformity with
that of the civil law states described above85 and would serve to foster the
unity of legislation and result which the Warsaw Convention foresaw.
8 6
84. See, e.g., the American authorities examined in the first section of this comment
and Drion, Limitation of Liabilities, supra note 58.
89. See, e.g., Grein v. Imperial Airways, supra note 76; Preston v. Hunting Air
Transport, supra note 83; Hennessy v. Air France, supra note 54; A v. B, supra note
62; Fischer et al. v. C.I.E. S.A.B.E.N.A., supra note 65; Georgiades, supra note 52; cf.
Football Team Torino v. S.A., Aviolinee Italiane, supra note 64.
86. See Hennessy v. Air France, supra note 54.
